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distinction finds statutory support in Penal Law 215:55, wherein punishment for a criminal contempt adjudicated under 750(A)(3) of the
Judiciary Law is declared not to preclude criminal prosecution for the
same conduct.
While the continued erosion of the simple common-law maxim,
nemo debet bis puniri pro uno delicto,230 may properly be the subject
of criticism, 240 it appears to be sound policy, for purposes of double
jeopardy, to distinguish between the commission of a single crime and
the type of conduct involved in Colombo. The mildness of the judicial
contempt sanction in New York makes the instant decision all the more
palatable.
SURROGATE PRACTICE

Waiver of citation and consent to probate: Pre-probate decree withdrawal permitted where status quo remained unchanged.
Section 401(4) of the Surrogate's Court Procedure Act 241 provides
that in any proceeding within the subject matter jurisdiction of the
Surrogate's Court, the filing of a waiver of issuance and service of process shall constitute a notice of appearance. 242 Although this same act
makes no provision for the filing of a consent to probate (an act which
is wholly unnecessary so long as there is a valid waiver Of citation), 243
244
that consent is normally embodied in the original waiver of process.
239 "No man ought to be punished twice for one offense." BLAcK's LAW DICTIONARY
1189 (4th ed. 1951).
240 See, e.g., Bartkus v. Illinois, 359 U.S. 121, 150 (1958) (Black, J., dissenting); Abbate
v. United States, 359 U.S. 187, 201 (1958) (Black J., dissenting). See generally Note, Double
Jeopardy:A Vanishing ConstitutionalRight, 14 How. L. J. 360 (1968); Note, Constitutional
Law - Double Jeopardy, 13 N.Y.L.F. 133 (1967).
241 N.Y. SuPRR. CT. PRoc. AcT § 401(4) (McKinney 1967) [hereinafter SCPA]:
Appearance by waiver of process. Any adult competent party may also appear
by an acknowledged waiver of issuance and service of process ....
In a probate
proceeding the waiver shall state the date of the will to which it relates.
242 It is in that reference that the document serves to confer in personam jurisdiction
on the court, as the maker "appears" in the Surrogate's Court and "waives" the issuing
and service of a citation. SCPA § 203 states that "[p]ersonal jurisdiction of parties is
obtained by service of process upon the parties or by submission to the jurisdiction of
the court by waiver of issuance and service of process .... " (Emphasis added). It should
be noted that SCPA § 1403 sets out those persons upon whom process is to be served in a
proceeding for the probate of a will where no waiver has been executed. It is of further
significance that a majority of all probate proceedings are dealt with by waiver of citation,
and that less than one percent of all will contests are ever successful. In re Frutiger,
29 N.Y.2d 143, 155, 272 N.E.2d 543, 549, 324 N.Y.S.2d 36, 45 (1971) (Burke, J., dissenting).
243"For a valid probate the portion relating to consent is unnecessary. When a
citation is issued and no objections are filed, there are no consents by the person so cited."
In re Frutiger 62 Misc. 2d 169, 167, 308 N.Y.S2d 692, 697 (Sur. Ct. Broome County), rev'd,
35 App. Div. 2d 755, 814 N.Y.S.2d 949 (3d Dep't 1970), rev'd 29 N.Y.2d 143, 272 N.E.2d
543, 324 N.Y.S.2d 36 (1971).
244 See, e.g., 25 CARMODY-WAIT 2d § 149:183, at 170-71 (1968).
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Where a person of legal age and sound mind properly executes a

waiver of consent [irrespective of a consent to probate], he cannot
withdraw unless he establishes the essential facts showing grounds
for such withdrawal. To a very large extent, the rules are the same

a person seeks to avoid the effect of any
as those that apply where
24
contract in writing. *
However, it must be stressed that in treating waivers of citation as
coming within the purview of contract law (and thus requiring a showing of fraud, coercion, misrepresentation or some other ground necessary to void the waiver), such has been held to apply solely in matters
arising post-decree. With this, the majority in Matter of Frutiger24 had
no complaint. Indeed, in dicta, the Frutiger majority cited with ap-

247
proval numerous decisions which permitted post decree withdrawals.
In Matter of Teller,24S-a case cited by the Court of Appeals-the
Appellate Division, Fourth Department, held that where a petitioner
seeks to open a final decree, fraud must be alleged. Furthermore, in
Matter of Westberg, 49 the appellate division held that in order to open
a final decree admitting a will to probate, the plaintiff must be able to
show fraud, coercion, misrepresentation or some other ground which
will vitiate the waiver. Clearly, the law relating to the opening of a final

decree admitting a will to probate is contractual, 250 and to that law the
4A (6th ed. 1970).
245 1A WARRFN'S HEATON, SURRoGATE'S COURTS § 73
246 29 N.Y.2d at 149, 272 N.E.2d at 545, 324 N.Y.S.2d at 39.
247 The following cases and authorities were among those cited by the New York
Court of Appeals in its discussion of the point in issue: In re Hawley, 6 App. Div. 2d 594,
180 N.YS.2d 168 (3d Dep't 1958); In re Baldwin, 3 App. Div. 2d 635, 158 N.Y.S.2d 39
(3d Dep't 1956); In re Pearson, 19 Misc. 2d 833, 185 N.Y.S.2d 971 (Sur. Ct. Westchester
County 1959); In re White, 16 Misc. 2d 22, 187 N.Y.S.2d 833 (Sur. Ct. Cattaraugus County
1959); In re Hinderson, 4 Misc. 2d 559, 150 N.Y.S.2d 869 (Sur. Ct. Westchester County),
aff'd, 2 App. Div. 2d 682, 153 N.Y.S.2d 584 (2d Dep't 1956). See generally 25 CAnioDY-WArr
4A (5th ed.
2d § 149:184, at 172 (1968); 1A WARREN'S HEATON, SURROGATE'S COURTS § 73,
1970).
248
In re Teller, 277 App.. Div. 937, 98 N.YXS2d 875 (4th Dep't 1950).
249 In re Westberg, 254 App. Div. 320, 5 N.Y.S.2d 31 (Ist Dep't) appeal dismissed,
279 N.Y. 316, 18 N.E.2d 291 (1938), motion for reargument denied, 283 N.Y. 589, 27
N.E.2d 444 (1940).
250 The law is clear as to this, with the exception of In re Sturges, 24 Misc. 2d 14,
202 N.Y.S.2d 737 (Sur. Ct. Nassau County 1960). However, in Sturges, a petition for a
pre-decree withdrawal was denied by the surrogate, who relied solely upon previous
authority wherein application t6 withdraw the waivers was made post-decree. The New
York Court of Appeals agreed, in Frutiger, that an application post-decree warrants a
test of fraud, coercion or misrepresentation.
A contract may be released, discharged, terminated or rescinded for numerous reasons.
Of pertinence to the case at issue are those releases, both express and implied, due to
fraud, duress, mistake, and mutual agreement. See, e.g., Rodgers v. Rodgers, 235 N.Y. 408,
139 N.E. 557, modified on reargument on other grounds, 236 N.Y. 577, 142 N.E. 290 (1923);
Levine v. Levy, 285 App. Div. 848, 136 N.Y.S.2d 695 (4th Dep't 1955); In re McGlone's
Will, 258 App. Div. 597, 17 N.YS.2d 539 (1940); Stowell Motor Car Co. v. Hull, 117 Misc.
789, 191 N.Y.S. 570 (Sup. Ct. Broome County 1921). As the law relating to the with-

ST. JOHN'S LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 46:355

New York Court of Appeals makes no exception. For, Matter of Frutiger251 is a case in which no final decree had been rendered.
Ernest and Willard Frutiger, decedent's brothers and only distributees, met immediately following decedent's internment on June 24,
1965, at the office of the trust company named as executor to the estate.
The Frutiger brothers, at the request of the trust company's attorney
and without explanation as to the nature and effect of the waivers and
consents to be signed, 252 signed the documents, which in fact read that
the signatory
appears in the Surrogate's Court of Broome County, N.Y., and
waives the issuing and service of a citation in this matter, and hereby
consents that the Last Will and Testament of such decedent bearing the date of... be admitted to probate by the Surrogate 2of
53
Broome County, N.Y., without further notice to the undersigned.
It should be noted that upon completion of the meeting between the
brothers and the trust company, both Ernest and Willard Frutiger
retained separate counsel, and that neither brother mentioned to
counsel, for a period of almost forty-five months-the time between the
signing and filing of the waivers and consents-that they had signed
any of the documents in issue. Nor did counsel for the trust company
during this time mention the signing of those documents to counsel for
the Frutigers; even though it was well known from the first meeting
between the parties that the Frutigers were planning to contest the
will.254 The probate petition was filed on March 4, 1968, and a citation
drawal of waivers of citation post-decree is no more than standard contract law, the only
problems presented in the determination thereof are questions of fact and applicability.
251 29 N.Y.2d 143, 272 N.E.2d 543, 324 N.Y.S.2d 36.
252 It is to be noted here, however, that the law means for that omission to be of
no consequence. "Ordinarily, the signer of a deed or other instrument, expressive of a
jural act, is conclusively bound thereby. That his mind never gave assent to the terms
expressed is not material." Pimpinello v. Swift SL Co., 253 N.Y. 159, 162, 170 N.E. 580,
531 (1930). In Pimpinello, plaintiff being unable to read, on the advice of his attorney
signed papers which he believed were an acknowledgement of defendant's payment in
satisfaction of a personal injury claim. As a matter of fact, plaintiff signed a general
release. Although the court held the general release to be invalid, the general rule, as
previously stated, was nonetheless looked upon with complete favor. Furthermore, it was
held in In re Anderson, 22 Misc. 2d 662, 663, 198 N.Y.S.2d 779, 781 (Sur. Ct. Suffolk
County 1960), that
[t]here was no obligation on the part of proponents or their attorney to advise the
objectant of the nature and effect of such waiver [Referring to a waiver of citation]. He is chargeable with knowledge of the contents and the legal effects of
such waiver whether or not he availed himself of the advice of counsel at the
time of the execution thereof.
253 29 N.Y.2d at 146, 272 N.E.2d at 544, 824 N.Y.S.2d at 37.
254The surrogate viewed this as an implied agreement to withdraw and cancel the

waiver:
The conduct of the attorneys for the proponent from November, 1965, when the
first -conference was held attended by -counsel for the brothers, during which it
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was issued and served on the Frutiger brothers 215 On June 28, 1968,
objections to the will were filed, but waivers were not filed until March
18, 1969.
The Surrogate's Court based its decision allowing withdrawal
solely on the theory of implied agreement.25 6 Furthermore, it found,
as trier of fact, that there was no fraud or misrepresentation regarding
the signing of the papers. The Appellate Division, Third Department,
reversed, and in turn, was reversed by the New York Court of Appeals.
In upholding the surrogate's decision, the Court implicitly stated that
its decision need not have been based solely on the authority as set down
in the Surrogate's Court. No mention was made of an implied agreement of withdrawal; rather, the Court propounded a holding wherein
the consent to probate was to be treated as "essentially a stipulation."2 57
appeared that objections to the will were being contemplated, and all of the
subsequent acts of counsel for the proponent and counsel for the Frutiger brothers,
have been consistent with only one conclusion, namely, that the waivers and
consents to probate were withdrawn and no longer valid between the parties.
62 Misc. 2d at 170-71, 308 N.Y.S.2d at 700.
While deciding in this manner, the surrogate rejected the two other grounds
advanced by the Frutigers for cause in vacating the waivers. First, it was contended that
the instruments were not validly acknowledged. Whereas SCPA § 401(4) requires an
acknowledgment for validity of the waiver of citation this would appear to be nonmandatory, as the surrogate found that an instrument is valid between the parties even
though a defective acknowledgment prevents its recording. See, e.g., 1 WARREN'S WaE
Nmv YoRK RrAL PROPERTY, Acknowledgements, § 3.10 (4th ed. 1950). And, in concluding
on that point, it was decided by the surrogate that an invalid acknowledgment does not
void the entire instrument and, therefore, under that theory, the waiver was still
maintainable.
Second, it was argued that the instruments were fraudulantly obtained. This argument
was dispensed with upon the finding that there was to be found "no credible evidence of
fraud on the part of the bank or it's attorney" in procuring the waivers.
The appellate division reversed, stating that
[w]hile the waivers and consents could have been withdrawn and canceled by
agreement, dearly there was no express agreement to this effect. And the delay in
producing and filing the documents involved is more rationally explained by the
explanation that they were forgotten about than inferring such an agreement.
35 App. Div. 2d at 755, 314 N.YS.2d at 950.
Indeed, Mr. Evans, vice-president of the trust company named as executor to the
estate, stated that he had tendered the waivers for filing in Surrogate's Court on
September 15, 1965, some three months after their procurement, but was told that they
could not be filed in the absence of any pending proceeding. It would be logical to
agree, therefore, more so with the Surrogate's Court in this matter, that being the body
acting as trier of fact, and likewise dispense with the appellate division's judgment as one
clearly erroneous in foundation. However, as will be discussed, in affirming the holding
of the Surrogate, the New York Court of Appeals embarked on a completely different
rationale.
:255 If there existed a valid waiver, this was indeed a most unnecessary step to probate.
256 See note 250 supra. Also, a waiver of contract provisions may be express, or it
may be implied from the acts of the parties. See, e.g., West v. Banigan, 51 App. Div. 328,
64 N.Y.S. 884 (2d Dep't 1900), aflf'd, 172 N.Y. 622, 65 N.E. 1123 (1902).
257 A contract is an agreement entered into by the mutual consent of the parties,
but a stipulation is an instrument taken by order of the court; its terms are
determined by the wil of the court, and not by that of the parties. Consequently
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"Indeed," the Court stated, "proponent's omission, over a period of
years, to make known the existence of the waivers procured in the presence of its officer and its attorney, served to preserve the status quo and
to contribute to any prejudice that has ensued. '258 In following the lead
of Campbell v. Bussing 259 and Foote v. Adams, 260 the Court held that
the stipulations were no longer valid, reversed the holding of the appellate division, and remanded the case to Surrogate's Court of Broome
County, with instructions to proceed as if the waivers and consents had
2 61
never been discussed, let alone signed.
Perhaps analogous to the decision reached by the Court of Appeals
in Frutigeris that Court's holding in Matter of Creekmore.202 In Creekmore, the decedent mother, of advanced years, bequeathed her two

savings accounts in equal shares to each of her two daughters. When
Mrs. Creekmore became fatally ill, a request was made on her behalf
to her attorney, by her daughter, Mrs. Rowland, to secure powers of
attorney regarding her bank accounts and safe-deposit box. Mrs. Rowit is to be interpreted by the intention of the court only, as to the nature and
intent of its obligation. It being an instrument taken in the interest of justice,
to sustain the jurisdiction of the court, it ought not to receive such a construction
as would deprive either party of any of his legal rights.
Lewis v. Orpheus, 15 F. Cas. 492, 493 (No. 8,330) (D. Mass. 1858).
25829 N.Y.2d at 150, 272 N.E.2d at 546, 324 N.Y.S.2d at 41.
259 274 App. Div. 893, 82 N.Y.S.2d 616-17 (2d Dep't 1948), held that
[t]he court has control over stipulations and power to relieve from the terms
thereof when the parties can be placed in statu quo [sic]. But the stipulation will
not be destroyed without a showing of good cause therefor, such as fraud, collusion, mistake, accident, or some other ground of the same nature....
260 232 App. Div. 60, 63, 248 N.Y.S. 539, 542 (2d Dep't 1931), stated that the principle
as proposed in the Campbell decision was not to be limited to mistakes of mutuality only.
As set down in Van Nuys v. Titsworth, 57 Hun. 5, 7, 10 N.Y.S. 507, 508 (Sup. Ct. Gen. T.
5th Dep't 1890)
It is sufficient if it appear that either party has inadvertently, unadviseably or
improvidently entered into an agreement which will take the case out of the
due and ordinary course of proceeding in the action, and in so doing may work
to his prejudice. Where both parties can be restored to substantially their former
position the court, as a general rule, exercises such power if it appears that the
stipulation was entered into inadvisedly or that it would be inequitable to hold
the parties to it.
Magnolia Metal Co. v. Pound, 60 App. Div. 318, 320, 70 N.Y.S. 230, 231 (1st Dep't 1901).
261 It is of considerable note here that the Court of Appeals in upholding the
surrogate's decision, need not have advanced the theory of stipulation for affirmance of
the lower court. As trier of fact, the surrogate's determination involving an implied
agreement of withdrawal could have easily been affirmed by the Court of Appeals.
Furthermore, any contract where there exists a case of unilateral mistake, may be set
aside for the reason of hardship (see Williston, Mutual Assent in the Formation of

Contracts, 14 ILL. L. REv. 85 (1919), so long as the contracting parties can be restored to
the positions they had occupied prior to the signing of the contract. See, e.g., Mowatt v.
Wright, I Wend. 353 (Sup. Ct. N.Y. 1828). Clearly, therefore, having found that "the
proponent [had] not changed its position by reason of the waiver, and that the status quo
[remained]," the court could have held under the theory of hardship and unilateral
mistake.
262 1 N.Y.2d 284, 135 N.E.2d 193, 152 N.Y.S.2d 449 (1956).
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land desired the power to pay her mother's bills as they became necessary. Mr. Matthews, Mrs. Creekmore's attorney, procured for her the
power of attorney relating to the safe-deposit box and to the one bank
account as per that request. But, in attempting to procure the same from
another bank for another account, he was informed that powers of
attorney were disfavored under company policy. Instead, it was recommended that the account be changed to a joint account. For that purpose, certain papers were procured by him for Mrs. Creekmore. Mrs.
Creekmore, having been advised by counsel of the nature and effect of
that which she was signing, and before a notary public, signed the documents in issue to establish a joint account with her daughter, Mrs. Rowland.
In his decision, the surrogate found that Mrs. Rowland, "[had] not
shown that the alleged joint accounts were knowingly and consciously
created and sanctioned by her mother." 2 3 In modifying that decision,
the Appellate Division, Second Department, held:
The evidence showed that the accounts and deposits therein were
in the form prescribed by subdivision 3 of section 289 of the Banking Law. Such evidence established conclusively the intention to
vest title in the survivor to the monies in the accounts at the time
of death. 20 4
However, the Court of Appeals, in a four to three decision, reversed
263 139 N.Y.S.2d 434, 437 (Sur. Ct. Queens County 1954).
264 286 App. Div. 857, 141 N.Y.S.2d 556, 557 (2d Dep't 1955). The repeal of the
N.Y. BANFLNG LAw § 239(3) (McKinney 1950) was made effective June 1, 1965. Prior to
that repeal date, subdivision 3 read that
[t]he making of the deposit in such form shall, in the absence of fraud or undue
influence, be conclusive evidence, in any action or proceeding to which either the
savings bank or the surviving depositor is a party, of the intention of both
depositors to vest title to such deposit and the additions thereto in such survivor.
(Emphasis added.)
And in an unbroken line of decisions, the Court of Appeals, prior to Creekmore,
had declared that provision to mean precisely what it said. See Walsh v. Keenan, 293
N.Y. 573, 59 N.E.2d 409 (1944); Inda v. Inda, 288 N.Y. 315, 43 N.E.2d 59 (1942); Matter of
Juedel, 280 N.Y. 37, 19 N.E.2d 671 (1939); In re Fenelon, 262 N.Y. 308, 186 N.E. 794 (1933);
In re Poriando, 256 N.Y. 423, 176 N.E. 826 (1931); Moskowitz v. Marrow, 251 N.Y. 380,
167 N.E. 506 (1929). The statute was said to create a presumption "irrefutable by proof,
and, therefore, a rule of substantive law." In re Porianda, 256 N.Y. at 425, 176 N.E. at
827. Where the deposit is so made, "the actual intent of [the depositor] makes no
difference ..
" Inda v. Inda, 288 N.Y. at 318, 43 N.E.2d at 61. Even where it was
expressly found that a joint account was not intended, that the depositor intended that
he be privileged to make withdrawals during his life, the Court of Appeals held, "[c]ontededly the statutory presumption that [the survivor] was a joint tenant with the testator
then [upon the latter's death] became conclusive in her favor...,. with the result that she
was at all events entitled thereto as survivor." (Emphasis added). In re Juedel, 280 N.Y.
at 41, 19 N.E.2d at 672; see also Inda v. Inda 288 N.Y. at 318, 43 N.E.2d at 61. Where
there is compliance with the demands of the statute, the legal result of a joint account
with survivorship must follow as "a rule of substantive law." In re Porianda, 256 N.Y.
at 425, 176 N.E. at 827.
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the appellate division, on the unsupported ground 265 that Mrs. Creekmore did not "knowingly and consciously" create the joint accounts,
and thus reinstated precisely the surrogate's finding. The Court found
no evidence of incompetence, fraud or undue influence, and drew no
inference of incapacity, but, nonetheless, affirmed the surrogate. In construing her actions under the ordinary rules of evidence, and with total
disregard of the conclusive establishment of intent as set forth in the
Banking Law, the signing by Mrs. Creekmore of the documents in issue
certainly would have been a sufficient basis for charging her with knowledge of and the legal consequences of her actions.2 66 Why then did the
Court of Appeals reverse the decision of the appellate division?
Although the Court's opinion is not perfectly clear, it appears that
the majority reasoned that the physical condition of the decedent, in
conjunction with the unlikelihood of any intent on her part to disinherit her other daughter, raised an inference that the joint account had
not been created consciously. Necessarily inherent in that inference,
however, is the premise that the depositor must understand the incidents of the joint tenancy if he is to be charged with a conscious crea26 7
tion thereof. But such was not the meaning of the law as written.
Clearly, therefore, both the Creekmore and Frutiger Courts were motivated by the desire to avoid hardship. 268 The majority in Frutiger,from
which only Judge Burke dissented, propounded its holding on an
equitable, rather that a legal theory, that the status quo had not been
altered. And, in so finding, the Court was able, in its own discretion, as
preliminary to a final decree, to withdraw from the merits of the case
the signed waivers of consent, and to allow the Frutigers to proceed
unencumbered hereby in their action to contest the will.
It was in accord with Judge Fuld's dissent in Creekmore that Judge
Burke, in an extremely powerful yet singular opinion, dissented. Judge
Fuld had stated, "[i]f there is dissatisfaction with the law as enacted by
2065 See note 260 supra.
266 See, e.g., 7 J. WIGmoRE, EVIDENCE § 2134 (3d ed. 1940); 9 id. § 2415. See also
Pimpinello v. Swift & Co., 253 N.Y. 159, 170 N.E. 530 (1930); Metzger v. Aetna Ins. Co.,
227 N.Y. 411, 125 N.E. 814 (1920).
267 See note 260 supra. On March 23, 1964, the Banking Law § 239 was amended so

as to repeal subdivision 3. In its place now is N.Y. BANKING LAW § 675 (McKinney 1971)
wherein subdivision (b) states that "[t]he making of such deposit or the issuance of such
shares in such form shall, in the absence of fraud or undue influence, be prima fade
evidence . . . of the intention of both depositors or shareholders to create a joint
tenancy.
(Emphasis added). The conclusive evidence rule has now been abolished;
the rebuttable presumption rule has been incorporated in its stead.
268See note 260 supra. The weight of the law was totally opposed to the decision
as rendered in Creekmore. That her physical condition was of great importance in the
decision there, cannot be doubted.
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the legislature or its application seems to work a hardship on this or that
case, it is for the legislature, not the court, to rewrite it."2169 Judge Burke

stated, "The theory that a different rule should govern waivers and
consents sought to be reneged upon before the entry of a decree is baseless," 270 citing Matter of Sturges.2 71 For,
[t]here is no provision of the Surrogate's Court Act or any other
statute or decision which empowers the Surrogate to exercise discretion to treat a waiver of citation and a consent to the entry of
a decree as a stipulation. In this case, this appellate court invents
on a question which was
a doctrine without notice to counsel
2 72

never presented to the court below.

But such was not troublesome to the Court. Sturges was looked
upon as a fallible doctrine, and the majority summarily disregarded
it.273 And, although prompted by emotion, the Court nonetheless formulated good law. As did the surrogate in Matter of Bissell,274 the Court
of Appeals took the position that, even in the absence of a showing of
fraud, where a pre-decree application is made to allow the withdrawal
of waivers of citation, such an application shall be granted where there
will be no prejudice toward any of the interested parties. 275 Each application should be considered on its merits, the Court rightly reasoned.
Justice Burke opined that Sturges should be the basis for the granting of a withdrawal application whether such is requested prior to or
subsequent to the final decree. But, Sturges applied post-decree law to
a pre-decree case, i.e., it required a showing of fraud, duress, misrepresentation, or other basis to invalidate the waiver, despite its pre-decree
nature.
Nonetheless, the decision in Frutigerhas been rendered, and its
impact is certain to be felt. It becomes clear, therefore, that instruments
of the type in issue in Frutigerwill be upheld or invalidated according
to judicial discretion. More relevant than that precept, however, is the
ability to discern when that power will be invoked so as to hold a waiver
of citation invalid.
269 1 N.Y.2d 284, 800, 135 N.E.2d 193, 201, 152 N.Y.S.2d 449, 461 (Fuld, J., dissenting).
270 29 N.Y.2d at 153, 272 NXE.2d at 548, 324 N.Y.S.2d at 43 (Burke, J., dissenting).
271 In re Sturges, 24 Misc. 2d 14, 202 N.Y.S.2d 737 (Sur. Ct. Nassau County 1960).
272 29 N.Y.2d at 156, 272 N.E.2d at 550, 324 N.Y.S.2d at 46 (Burke, J., dissenting).
Judge Burke also states that
[t]hese legal documents are not mere stipulations betnveen parties. They are
furnished by the clerk of the court in printed jurative form for use in probate
proceedings. They are unilaterally executed and notarized.
29 N.Y.2d at 155-56, 272 N.E.2d at 549, 324 N.Y.S2d at 45 (Burke, J., dissenting).
273 29 N.Y.2d at 149, 272 N.E.2d at 545, 324 N.YS.2d at 40.
274 In re Bissell, 57 Misc. 2d 220, 291 N.YS.2d 663 (Sur. Ct. Erie County 1968).
275 Id. at 221-22, 291 N.Y.S.2d at 665.
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It is necessary to stress again that the Frutigerholding was based
upon the finding that the status quo had been preserved. Indeed, had
the status quo been altered in any way, there is no reason to surmise
that the Court would have held as it did. Clearly, therefore, while the
Court acted within its discretion in allowing withdrawal of the waiver
of citation, it did not establish precedent for permitting withdrawal
where it would be prejudicial, e.g., after a final decree.

